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On January 10, 1971, a South Vietnamese delegation arrived in Bangui, capital of the 
Central African Republic, escorted in style aboard President-for-Life Jean-BéGHO%RNDVVD¶V
private jet.  Flanked by Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and Intelligence personnel, seventeen-year-
old Martine Thӏ NguyӉn, a cement factory worker from the outskirts of Saigon, emerged from 
the aircraft and was seated at the center of a motorcade to the palace, where Bokassa and his 
cabinet were waiting.  The President immediately pulled down her trousers ± and, confirming 
that she indeed bore a telltale scar, embraced Martine before bursting into tears.  It appeared 
Bokassa, a famously licentious French army sergeant posted to Saigon during the Franco-
Vietnamese War, had reunited at last with his long-lost out-of-wedlock Vietnamese daughter.1 
 Martine Thӏ NguyӉn was not, however, the first mixed-race Vietnamese debutant 
SUHVHQWHGDV%RNDVVD¶VGDXJKWHURQWKH&HQWUDO$IULcan social scene.  Two months earlier, 
Martine NguyӉn Thӏ Bái, a cigarette vendor living in a Saigon shack made from crushed soda 
cans, had been feted in Bangui with more much lavish celebrations, complete with several days 
of ceremonies, banquets, and balls.  But when tabloid Tr 㜀nJÿHn revealed the first Martine to be 
an imposter, an enraged Bokassa threatened to retaliate by severing relations with Saigon and 
endorsing the Vietnamese communists.  Matters were not helped when Fidèle Obrou, the first 
0DUWLQH¶V&HQWUDO$IULFDQKXVEDQGIURPDKDVWLO\-arranged marriage, was sent to the firing squad 
for orchestrating a botched assassination plot against Bokassa.2  Desperate to secure international 
UHFRJQLWLRQDQGFRXQWHU+DQRL¶VLPSUHVVLYHV\PSDWKHWLF$IULFDQYRWLQJEORFWKH6RXWK
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry sprang into action, hoping to woo the mercurial President-for-Life 
back to fold.  Assisted by Tr 㜀nJÿHn¶VVHQVDWLRQDOL]HGFRYHUDJHRIWKHVHDUFKIRU6DLJRQ¶V
³$IULFDQIDLU\-WDOHSULQFHVV´0LQLVWU\RIILFLDOVPDQDJHGWRSURFXUHand dispatch WKH³UHDO´
                                                          
1
 Author Interview with Phan Công Tâm, Republic of Vietnam Central Intelligence Organization Director of the 
Office of Operation Plans/Assistant to the Commissioner for Special Operations. August 22, 2015, Ithaca, NY.   
2
 Brian E. Titley, Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa (Montreal, 1997), 63. 
0DUWLQHFHPHQWLQJRQHRIWKH&ROG:DU¶VXQOLNHOLHUSDUWQHUVKLSV3  And though the second 
³UHDO´0DUWLQH¶VDUULYDOZDVDPRUHVXEGXHGDIIDLU%RNDVVDQRQHWKHOHVVWUHDWHGKLVJXHVWVE\
producing a guitar after several celebratory drinks, and serenading them in Vietnamese with a 
selection of 1940s bar tunes.4 
Beyond merely an obscure if colorful episode in Cold War-era diplomacy, the encounter 
LQ%DQJXLUHYHDOVWKHVXUSULVLQJO\JOREDOVFDOHRI6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VGLSORPDWLFDPELWLRQVEHO\LQJ
the presumed insularity of a government often dismissed as little more than a puppet regime of 
the United States.5  ,QIDFWZKLOHGLSORPDF\KDGQRWEHHQDSULRULW\IRU3UHVLGHQW1J{ĈuQK
DiӋm (1954-1963) or during the turbulent period of coups, intrigue and regional insurrection that 
followed his deposal, the return to constitutional government in 1967 led to a rapid revival of 
interest in forging new international partnerships.  After American peace negotiations with Hanoi 
and the spectre of a Democratic Party victory in the 1968 Presidential Election led to widespread 
doubts in Saigon over American intentions, the need for alternative alliances grew all the more 
imperative.  )DFLQJEXGJHWDU\VKRUWIDOOVRIXSWRDEVHQW$PHULFDQDLGE\WKHVWDWH¶V
very existence was at stake.  As one Foreign Affairs Ministry planning memo put it, ³from 1965 
to March, 1968, the United States completely focused on military victory...  We only needed to 
H[SODLQWKDWRXUUHDVRQIRUILJKWLQJZDVWRUHVLVWFRPPXQLVP%XWVLQFH«WKHJUHDW
majority of political observers no longer doubt that America will pull all of its military forces out 
RI6RXWK9LHWQDP2XUGHVWLQ\QRZOLHVLQRXURZQIRUFHDQGDELOLW\´6   
                                                          
3
 ³0DUWLQH%RNDVVDPyQTXj[XkQFKR-HDQ%HGHO%RNDVVD´Tr ?QJÿHQ, (Saigon, Spring 1971). 
4
 3KDQ&{QJ7kP³7HVWLPRQ\RID6HQLRU2IILFHU&HQWUDO,QWHOOLJHQFH2UJDQL]DWLRQ´Voices from the Second 
Republic of South Vietnam (1967-1975). K.W. Taylor ed. (Ithaca, NY, 2014), 28. 
5
 See, for instance, David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era. 
Revised ed. (New York, 1988), 16-19; James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State-Building, 
1954-1968 (New York, 2008), 10-14.  
6
 Phùng NhұW0LQK³&{QJWiF1JRҥi giao´$XJXVW+61772, Phӫ Tәng thӕQJĈӋ nhӏ Cӝng hòa (hereafter 
PTTDIICH)/Vietnam National Archives Center II (hereafter VNAC2).  
Beginning in earnest in 1968, South Vietnam embarked on a sweeping worldwide 
campaign to rebrand itself as a progressive alternative to the communist North, hoping to secure 
new channels of support beyond Washington, and to attain international credibility after years of 
effectively ceding diplomacy and public relations to both the United States and the Vietnamese 
FRPPXQLVWV$WWKHKHDUWRIWKLVHIIRUWZDV6DLJRQ¶VDSSDUHQWGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDOSURJUHVV
beginning with a new constitution and nationwide elections for President and a new bicameral 
legislature in 1967.  Almost from the outset however, the initiative faced formidable obstacles.  
The sheer scope of the endeavoUSXVKHGWKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\¶Vfinancial and administrative 
capabilities to the limit, with South Vietnamese envoys hindered by language barriers and often 
comically misinformed about their destinations.  A series of ill-conceived associations with 
sympathetic but politically-toxic local fringe parties ensued, reinforcing rather than rehabilitating 
6RXWK9LHWQDP¶s pariah status.  Worse still, rather than promote 6DLJRQ¶VRVWHQVLEOH democratic 
transition, traveling delegates from the newly-established National Assembly seized on the 
international platform now afforded them to denounce President NguyӉQ9ăQ7KLӋu¶V 
interference with the legislature.  Beyond these administrative difficulties, South Vietnam also 
struggled to position itself in a rapidly changing region, where Sino-American rapprochement 
and reduced U.S. commitments saw Southeast Asian statesmen reconciling with Beijing and 
revising their strategic assessments of the Vietnam War.   
But by far the biggest challenge to effective foreign policy was the profound 
contradiction EHWZHHQ6DLJRQ¶VGLSORPDWLFDQGGRPHVWLFimperatives.  In the wake of South 
9LHWQDP¶Vcontentious 1967 elections, incoming President Gen. NguyӉQ9ăQ7KLӋu partnered 
with vehemently anti-communist northern Catholic political parties, whose disciplined grassroots 
organization helped them triumph in the Assembly elections despite numerical disadvantages.  
Alarmed by developments in Washington and Paris, these newly-elected hawks hastened to 
assert themselves by condemning the peace talks and lashing out against a Foreign Ministry 
eager to present a progressive image to attract overseas support.  On the other side of the 
spectrum, a coalition of mostly southern liberal religious and political groups pressed the 
government to play a constructive part in deliberations with Hanoi, anticipating that the United 
States would respond to an obstinate South Vietnam by excluding it from negotiations altogether.   
([DVSHUDWHGE\WKHWZRFDPSV¶GHWHULRUDWLQJrelations and increasingly dramatic 
exchanges, NguyӉQ9ăQ7KLӋu lost patience with civilian politics altogether, effectively binding 
himself to hardliners who accepted his growing authoritarianism in exchange for patronage and 
an intransigent position in Paris.  This process culminated in ThiӋX¶VEODWDQWO\rigged and widely 
condemned uncontested 1971 re-election%XWLQFUXVKLQJ6DLJRQ¶VEXUJHRQLQJLIFKDRWLF
constitutional government, ThiӋu betrayed the basic premise of South Vietnamese diplomacy, 
infuriating American congressional patrons DQGVHYHUHO\FRPSURPLVLQJ6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VVHDUFK
for alternative partners.  At a time when Sino-American rapprochement seemed to negate 
6DLJRQ¶VVWUDtegic importance, prospective allies saw few incentives for associating with a weak 
and unpopular regime.  Thus, in simultaneously failing to address the internal shortfalls that 
necessitated indefinite foreign aid while repelling international observers with its domestic 
crackdown, the ThiӋu government contributed greatly to the timing and the severity of the fateful 
1973 U.S. settlement with North Vietnam.  This significant if indirect impact has been largely 
RYHUORRNHGLQVWXGLHVRIWKHZDU¶VGHQRXHPHQW, which have focused primarily on United States-
North Vietnamese negotiations in Paris, where Saigon was a marginal player.7  
                                                          
7
 Examples include Jeffrey Kimball, 1L[RQ¶V9LHWQam War (Lawrence, 1998); Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: 
Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill, 2002). 
Additionally, while studies purporting WRSURYLGHDQ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´KLVWRU\RIWKH
Vietnam War date back over thirty years, newly accessible official Vietnamese sources have led 
to a wave of publications exploring 9LHWQDPHVHSHUVSHFWLYHVRIWKHZDUWKRXJK6RXWK9LHWQDP¶V
Second Republic (1967-1975) remains almost wholly neglected.8  This burst of output coincides 
with the overall trend in diplomatic history towards multinational archival research in which 
non-state actors play an ever more prominent role.9  Particular attention has been devoted to the 
1970s, when a series of interconnected political, economic and intellectual crises forced heads of 
state to confront complex challenges stemming from a surge in global interdependence.10  The 
conflict in Vietnam was a key factor in this prevailing sense of turbulence: ³SHUKDSVQRRWKHU
crisis contributed more to the global shock of the VWKDQWKH9LHWQDP:DU´ZULWHVKLVWRULDQ
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, noting Vietnamese involvement in Central American and Africa.11  
During a recent keynote address, Nguyen goes further, suggesting that Vietnamese communists 
saw themselves as engaged in a common global struggle against the same structural forces 
contested by UDGLFDO3DOHVWLQLDQZRPHQ¶VJURXSV12   
But while internationally-oriented studies of the Vietnam War have thus far focused on 
communist ³SHRSOH¶V´RU³JXHULOOD´GLSORPDF\LQFRPPRQZLWh other accounts of Cold War-era 
FRQIOLFWVZKRVHSURWDJRQLVWVSUHYDLOHGE\³LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]LQJ´ORFDOJULHYDQFHVWRWKHLU
advantage, Saigon¶VQROHVVJOREDOO\ ambitious foreign policy after 1967 has thus far been all but 
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 See, for example, R.B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Revolution vs. Containment, 1955-
1961. Vol. I. (New York, 1983); Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of 
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA, 2013). 
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&DPEULGJH0$(UH]0DQHOD³$3R[RQ<RXU1DUUDWLYH:ULWLQJ'LVHDVH&RQWUROLQWR&ROG:DU+LVWRU\´
Diplomatic History, 34, no. 2 (April 2010). 
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 ed. Niall Ferguson et al., The Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 2010). 
11
 Lien-+DQJ71JX\HQ³7KH9LHWQDP'HFDGHWKH*OREDO6KRFNRIWKH:DU´The Shock of the Global: the 1970s 
in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson et al. (Cambridge, MA, 2010). 
12
 1JX\HQ³5HYROXWLRQDU\&LUFXLWV7RZDUG,QWHUQDWLRQDOL]LQJ$PHULFDLQWKH:RUOG´Diplomatic History, 39, no. 
3 (June 2015): 420. 
ignored.  Its political class however, present at the outset of non-alignment at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, saw itself as embodying a global spirit of post-colonial national liberation, as 
determined if unsuccessful efforts to resist American influence attest.13  Faced with its own 
³VKRFNRIWKHJOREDO´when American support grew uncertain after 1968, the Second Republic 
undertook a frantic if largely failed search for international assistance.   
South Vietnam then represents an instructive counter to more familiar emblems of non-
alignment, which succeeded where the ThiӋu regime failed despite its similar pursuit of what one 
KLVWRULDQGHVFULEHVDV³GLSORPDWLFUHYROXWLRQ´± securing domestic objectives through external 
support and legitimacy.14  As the diverse network of right-wing state and non-state actors which 
embraced South Vietnam suggests, the globalization of post-colonial struggles was hardly the 
exclusive preserve of the left, though progressive movements fared rather better attracting public 
and scholarly attention.  Considering failed bids to internationalize local conflicts is critical 
however if we are to transcend a mere YLFWRU¶VKLVWRU\RIGLSORPDWLFUHYROXWLRQ, where global 
outreach becomes a teleological process which invariably propels local contenders to victory.  At 
a time when diplomatic history has grown ever more cosmopolitan to interpret an increasingly 
interdependent world, 6DLJRQ¶VUHYHDOLQJIDLOXUHVHUYHVDVDreminder that the pursuit of 
international legitimacy often proves elusive absent a demonstrable domestic support base. 
ORIGINS OF DIPLOMATIC DEPENDENCY 
Perhaps surprisingly given its subsequent pariah status, South Vietnam was initially seen 
to have surpassed LWVFRPPXQLVWQHLJKERU¶VGLSORPDF\.  Writing in 1963, French journalist and 
9LHWQDPH[SHUW%HUQDUG)DOOREVHUYHGWKDW³LQWKHILHOGRIIRUHLJQUHODWLRQV«6RXWK9LHW-Nam 
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 (GZDUG0LOOHU³7KH'LSORPDF\RI3HUVRQDOLVP&LYLOL]DWLRQ&XOWXUHDQGWKH&ROG:DULQWKH)RUHLJQ3ROLF\RI
Ngo Dinh DieP´Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1954-1962. eds. 
Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F Ostermann (Washington, 2009), 381-385. 
14
 Matthew Connelly, $'LSORPDWLF5HYROXWLRQ$OJHULD¶V)LJKWIRU,QGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKHOrigins of the Post-Cold 
War Era (New York, 2002).   
has been far more successful than its NRUWKHUQFRXQWHUSDUW«>LW@KDVVXFFHHGHGLQJDLQLQJ
acceptance from countries of the Afro-Asian bloc to an extent the dour North Vietnamese rulers 
have thus far been unable to matFK´15  Still, cracks were beginning to show towards the end of 
President 1J{ĈuQK'LӋP¶Vreign.  Wesley Fishel, one of DiӋP¶Vearliest American proponents, 
lamented in the in-house journal of pro-South Vietnam lobby group American Friends of 
Vietnam that DiӋm KDG³minimized the importance of international affairs for his country, and 
underestimated the contribution which a constructive diplomacy could make to his RZQFDXVH´16   
And with South Vietnam subsumed by chaos following DiӋP¶V 1963 assassination, foreign 
policy fell by the wayside in Saigon, allowing the communists to pull ahead.   
An enduring effect of the late and post DiӋm years was the estrangement of neutralist 
states like India, Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos, which Saigon shunned for refusing to sever ties 
with North Vietnam.  This approach, likened by American observers to Bonn¶V³+DOOVWHLQ
'RFWULQH´RIsuspending relations with states that recognized East Germany, ensured that 
WKURXJKQRUHDOHIIRUWRQ+DQRL¶VSDUWopportunities to engage with much of Southeast Asia were 
effectively surrendered by South Vietnam, a setback which the Second Republic struggled to 
overcome.  During the turbulent years of military coups and regional and religious polarization 
following DiӋP¶VRXVWHU6RXWK9LHWQDPHVHGLSORPDF\lagged at a time when the much-more 
internationally savvy Vietnamese communists made significant global public relations progress.  
Consular appointments were often selected to enrich elite military families; as a face-saving 
means of exiling out-of-favor commanders; or as platforms for rival generals to expand their 
drug-smuggling empires.  In 1967, when U.S. officials lobbied Foreign Minister TrҫQ9ăQĈӛ to 
appoint an Ambassador to Laos, the beleaguered statesman explained that his efforts had been 
                                                          
15
 Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. (New York, 1963), 388. 
16
 :LOOLDP+HQGHUVRQDQG:HVOH\5)LVKHO³7KH)RUHLJQ3ROLF\RI1JR'LQK'LHP´Vietnam Perspectives, 2, no. 
1 (August 1966): 5.  
thwarted for years by Prime Minister Gen. NguyӉn Cao KǤZKR³ZDQWHGWR «use this post for 
YDULRXVSURILWDEOHDFWLYLWLHVVXFKDVWKHJROGDQGRSLXPWUDIILF´³9LHQWLDQH´Ĉӛ added³ZDVE\
QRPHDQVWKHRQO\SRVWZKHUHKHKDGHQFRXQWHUHGWKLVSUREOHP´17  Reports of official complicity 
in the narcotics trade comSOLFDWHG6DLJRQ¶V most critical overseas alliance, as Americans 
increasingly pondered the pointed question posed by Senator Ernest Gruening in a speech titled 
³&RUUXSWLRQLQ6RXWK9LHWQDP0XVW2XU%R\s Continue to Die to Protect It´?18     
Its formal channels limited, South Vietnam instead resorted to domestic political 
machinations to project diplomatic signals, often by cooperating with ferociously anti-
communist northern Catholic refugee groups.  In February 1967, after Charles de Gaulle issued 
the latest periodic French proposal to end the war by neutralizing Southeast Asia, the Catholic 
Citizens Bloc staged an ³$Qti-3HDFH´rally at the Saigon Cathedral, burning effigies of de Gaulle, 
U Thant, William Fulbright, John F. Kennedy, and Ho Chi Minh.19  Two days later, the French 
Consulate was stormed by a mob smashing and burning whatever it could lay hands on.20   
In Paris and Washington, suspicion that the government was behind the violence was 
confirmed when more moderate Catholic leaders, eager to distance themselves from the 
Consulate raid, made it known that they had declined invitations to join Gen. NguyӉn Cao KǤ¶V
Anti-Corruption Youth in attacking the compound.21  On March 1, an irritated U.S. Ambassador 
Henry Cabot Lodge warned de facto leader KǤ that the episode made South Vietnam appear 
³LPPDWXUHDQGFOXPV\´ noting that while ³LWZDVSHUIHFWO\DOULJKWIRUSHRSOH to parade and carry 
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 Telegram 10911 Saigon to State Department, November 11, 1967, POL 15-1 Viet-S, 1967-1969 Central Foreign 
Policy File (hereafter CFPF), box 2764, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG59), National Archives (hereafter NARA). 
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 Telegram 18953 Saigon to State Department, February 25, 1967, POL 23-8 Viet-S, 1967-1969 CFPF, box 2772, 
RG59, NARA. 
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 Telegram 19058 Saigon to State Department, February 27, 1967, POL 23-8 Viet-S, 1967-1969, CFPF, box 2772, 
RG59, NARA. 
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 Telegram 19045 Saigon to State Department, February 27, 1967, POL 23-8 Viet-S, 1967-1969, CFPF, box 2772, 
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VLJQV«what reminded everyone of communist techniques was when they broke into the 
&RQVXODWH*HQHUDODQGVWDUWHGWREXUQDQGEHDWSHRSOHXS´22  Though France bore the worst of 
the diplomatically-motivated demonstrations, it was hardly the only country to face 6DLJRQ¶VOHVV
than subtle wrath.  After India agreed to host the communist Provisional Revolutionary 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V(PRG) NguyӉn Thӏ Bình, Foreign Minister TrҫQ9ăQ/ҳm warned that ³there are 
many Indians living in Saigon, and KHUYLVLWPLJKWFDXVHVWUHHWGHPRQVWUDWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHP´23  
Sure enough, as Mme. Bình arrived in New Delhi, the Indian Consulate in Saigon was swarmed 
by students who tore down the Indian flag.  The next day, U.S. Embassy reported that ³DJURXS
RIµYHWHUDQV¶VWDJHGDVHFRQGGHPRQVWUDWLRQ´prompting an angry Indian communique 
condemning ³UHJUHWWDEOHHYHQWV´LQ6DLJRQ24 
While such outbursts allowed the government to both signal displeasure and channel 
domestic anxieties abroad, they were hardly an effective means of pursuing overseas interests 
much less the basis of a coherent foreign policy, as cooler heads in the Foreign Ministry hastened 
to note.  But when South Vietnam began seeking to repair its neglected diplomacy, with 
mounting urgency after U.S.-North Vietnamese peace talks commenced in 1968, it confronted a 
strategic landscape that had changed dramatically since the DiӋm era, due in no small part to 
PDVVLYH$PHULFDQHVFDODWLRQRIWKHZDURQ6DLJRQ¶Vbehalf.  Alarmed by a spiralling anti-war 
movement, the Johnson Administration sought to HQKDQFHWKHZDU¶V credibility by recruiting 
sympathetic heads-of-state and troop-contributing allies, effectively bypassing South Vietnam in 
the conduct of its own international affairs.  This initiative, widely known as WKH³0DQ\)ODJV´
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 Telegram 19263 Saigon to State Department, March 1, 1967, POL 15-1 Viet-S, 1967-1969, CFPF, box 2763, 
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 Telegram 7135 Saigon to State Department, May 5, 1970, POL 1 Viet-S, 1970-1973, CFPF, box 2802, RG59, 
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 [Quotations in original] Telegram 12080 Saigon to State Department, July 28, 1970, POL 2 Viet-S, 1970-1973, 
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campaign, was explicitly premised on 6DLJRQ¶V ostensible efforts to implement progressive 
reforms like land redistribution, rural development, and transparent elections.  Allied 
belligerents, for their part, pledged to proactively pursue a peace settlement.25  Faced with 
growing political pressure over the war, the White House would often cite purported 
international support - ³WKHVWURQJHVWDUJXPHQWZHKDYHIRURXUSUHVHQFHLQ6RXWK9LHWQDPLVWKDW
RWKHUQDWLRQVLQWKHDUHDZDQWXVWKHUH´RIIHUHGSecretary of Defense Robert McNamara - when 
FRQVLGHULQJKRZWR³VHOORXUSURGXFWWRWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOH´DV-RKQVRQSXWLW26  
In practice, however, newly-enlisted international advocates of the war were more likely 
motivated by the promise of American good graces and largesse than by informed strategic 
assessments, as an Embassy report on Malawi¶V declaration of solidarity with South Vietnam 
VXJJHVWV³:KLOH>3ULPH0LQLVWHU+DVWLQJV%DQGD] correctly refers to rebellious elements of 
South Vietnam as Viet Cong, [he] terms those loyal to government as Viet Ming [sic].  
Nevertheless, speech is «possibly of considerable local usefulness. Banda aware and concurs 
WUDQVPLWWDOFRSLHVIRUH[SORLWDWLRQWRDGYDQFHIUHHZRUOGLQWHUHVWVLQDQ\ZD\SRVVLEOH´27  And 
while the troop-contributing countries ± Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, South Korea and the 
Philippines ± were no doubt better informed about FRQIOLFW¶VEDVLFSDUWLFLSDQWV, they too often 
explicitly linked participation to American military and financial aid.  A 1972 Defense 
Department report reveals the scale of the spoils, with the two South Korean divisions alone 
costing the United States more in 1969 than the entire combined Soviet and Chinese assistance to 
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Hanoi that year.28  Small wonder then Defense Minister Yi Tong Won would describe 6HRXO¶V 
6RXWKHDVW$VLDSROLF\DV³GLJJLQJIRUJROGLQWKHMXQJOHVRI9LHWQDP´29     
 Compounding matters were the DOOLHV¶ very different domestic priorities.  While Bangkok 
and Seoul broadcast the rewards of intervention in Vietnam to demonstrate tangible returns for 
their constituents, Manila, where anti-American sentiment ran high, kept its enticements obscure, 
lest President Marcos be accused of militarism or mercenary behaviour from critics back home.30  
³He might plunge 33 million FLOLSLQRVLQWRDVXLFLGDOZDU«MXVWWRDIILUPRQH¶s loyalty to a 
7H[DQ´ warned one Manila paper.31  These LQWULFDFLHVSRVHGDFKDOOHQJHIRU6RXWK9LHWQDP¶V
eager but inexperienced diplomats.  While planning a 1970 Troop-Contributing Countries 
summit, Foreign Minister TrҫQ9ăQ/ҳm provoked a scandal in Manila by formally inviting the 
Philippines, which was portraying its role in the war as strictly civilian.  Worse still, Lҳm 
summoned Malaysia and Japan as witnesses, jeopardizing longstanding plans to have them serve 
DV³LPSDUWLDOREVHUYHUV´LQDIXWXUHFHDVHILUH and compromising what was meant to have been a 
private gathering.  Fortunately, poor communication in the Foreign Ministry insured Kuala 
Lumpur¶ invitation had not actually been delivered as scheduled, while a relieved Tokyo was 
happy to accept LҳP¶VUHWUDFWLRQ³$OWKRXJKKHZDVQRWD\RXQJPDQ´/ҳm was recorded 
DGPLWWLQJ³WKHUHZHUHVWLOOWKLQJVKHZDVOHDUQLQJDVKHZHQWDERXWKLVQHZMREDQGSHUKDSVKH
had been at fault by WU\LQJWRµVWULNHWKHLURQZKLOHLWZDVKRW¶´32      
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All of this meant that with South Vietnam largely preoccupied by domestic upheaval 
until the advent of the Second Republic in 1967, the terms and conditions of its most important 
regional relationships were negotiated in Washington rather than Saigon.  This rendered the 
government an incidental player in its own foreign affairs, enabling it to ignore potential regional 
partners like Indonesia from behind the diplomatic and economic safety of the American 
umbrella.  And though neighbours were happy to accept inducements to fight on South 
9LHWQDP¶VEHKDOI6DLJRQ¶VVXERUGLQDWHVWDWXVGLGOLWWOHWRbolster its legitimacy, strategic value, 
or future prospects absent American support.  Behind closed doors, the other troop contributors 
were dismissive if not contemptuous of their putative ally, with South Korean officials, for 
instance, lamenting to Melvin Laird that 6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VOHDGHUV³VLPSO\GLGQ¶WKDYHWKHZLOO
DQGWKHGHVLUHWRPHHWWKHLUSUREOHPV´33  
SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE WORLD STAGE 
Though elections and a new constitution brought an end to the post-1J{ĈuQK'LӋm 
anarchy, the outcome of another no less critical contest - the 1968 U.S. Presidential Election ± 
loomed large, as did impending negotiations between Washington and Hanoi.  So important was 
the result of the U.S. showdown that, according to Director of Central Intelligence Linh Quang 
Viên¶VDQDO\VLV, even a Democratic Party primary win for peace candidate Robert Kennedy could 
lead to collapsing morale and mass desertions in the South Vietnamese army.34  And though 
6DLJRQ¶VSUHIHUUHGFDQGLGDWH5LFKDUG1L[RQXOWLPDWHO\SUHYDLOHGhis narrow victory underscored 
6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VVXVFHSWLELOLW\WRH[WHUQDOGHYHORpments over which it had little control.  A 1970 
report by Presidential Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs NguyӉQ3K~Ĉӭc identified chronic 
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dependence on the United States for military, financial and political support as Saigon¶VPRVW
pressing foreign policy concern.  Noting that more than half a million American troops in 
Vietnam had yet to bring the ZDUWRDFORVHĈӭc warned that the situation wDV³GLVDGYDQWDJHRXV
for our side in terms of the political and psychological aspects, because U.S. and world opinion 
has a tendency to compare the strength of a great power like the United States with a small 
country like North Vietnam, and in the face of this gap, they pressure the U.S. to withdraw early 
one way or another without paying enough attention to the fact that North Vietnam is the 
LQYDGLQJHQHP\´³7KHSUHVVXUHRI86SXEOLFRSLQLRQKDVIRUFHGXVWRVKRZJRRGZLOOWRZDUGV
SHDFH´he FRQWLQXHG³ZKLOHWKHFRPPXQLVWVLQYDGHXQUHSHQWDQWO\´35   
But regardless of the unsavory perceptions that American patronage engendered, South 
Vietnam had little choice but to clutch the double-edged sword of U.S. aid due to a structural 
inability to live within its means ± DIDFWĈӭc neglected to include in his report.  Consider, for 
instance, the 1970 National Budget:  plagued by corruption, woeful tax collection rates, and a 
massive but often ineffective military, South Vietnam faced projected 20% spending increases 
despite having collected less than 30% of anticipated expenses in tax revenue the previous 
year.36  Exacerbating matters, the United States suffered financial challenges of its own when, in 
1968, years of increased American exports and expenditures to promote the war prompted a run 
on the dollar against the price of gold.37  Though Richard Nixon relieved the pressure to some 
extent by withdrawing from the Gold Standard in 1971, the gold crisis meant that for the first 
time, the United States approached the limit of its capacity to sustain South Vietnam.  Nixon 
increasingly found himself subject to the spending restrictions proposed by Defense Secretary 
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Melvin Laird, who regarded the war as something of a distraction from the Soviet challenge.  
9LHWQDP/DLUGZURWHZDV³SXUHO\DQGVLPSO\ «RQHRIWKHPDMRUUHDVRQVWKH6RYLHW8QLRQKDV
been able to make such marked military strides relative to the United States during the past few 
years´IUDPLQJWKHLVVXHLQDPDQQHU that no Cold War-era President could dare to neglect.38  In 
any case, UHVSRQGLQJWRERWKHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHVZKLFK6RXWK9LHWQDP¶V dire 
reputation only intensified, the United States began redeploying troops out of Vietnam in 1969.  
'XEEHG³9LHWQDPL]DWLRQ´WRVXJJHVWDFRQVWUXFWLYH6RXWK9LHWQDPHVHUROHLQWKHSURFHVV86
withdrawal instead proved disastrous for the South Vietnamese economy, both increasing 
6DLJRQ¶VVKDUHRIWKHGefense burden while depriving citizens of a crucial source of economic 
activity ± providing services for American troops.  Perhaps a necessary compromise to prolong 
congressional support for the war, Vietnamization generated simultaneous inflation and 
unemployment in South Vietnam, with military expenses skyrocketing even as economic 
opportunities withered. 
Faced with eroding U.S. economic, military, and political support, South Vietnam cast its 
gaze abroad, seeking alternative partners to fill the yawning fiscal void.  In August 1968, newly-
appointed Foreign Minister Trҫn Chánh Thành delivered a speech at the new Vietnam Council of 
Foreign Relations, established to spearhead SaigRQ¶VJlobal public relations campaign by 
promoting South Vietnamese perspectives and interests abroad.  6KDWWHULQJWKH³+DOOVWHLQ´
doctrine, Thành proposed a ³SROLF\RISUHVHQFH´LQQHJOHFWHGQHXWUDOFRXQWULHVOLNH)UDQFH
Cambodia, Indonesia and India, prioritizing restored full consulates in all four countries while 
pursuing normalized relations.  Bolder still, Thành called for a settlement in Southeast Asia 
based on the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Conferences - a daring proposal indeed given that 
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predecessor TrҫQ9ăQĈӛ had been dismissed after similar remarks saw him excoriated in the 
National Assembly.  From now on, Thành concluded, South Vietnam would strive for peaceful 
coexistence with its neighbours, including North Vietnam provided Hanoi renounce interference 
and aggression.39  His remarks, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker noted with satisfaction, 
represented the beginning of a new era in South Vietnamese foreign relations, where positive 
diplomacy was no longer the sole preserve of the communists.40   
Despite these encouraging first steps, the government faced considerable challenges 
reforming its long-neglected foreign service.  Basic tasks like recruiting personnel with adequate 
language skills were a persistent problem, to say nothing of finding statesmen familiar with 
overseas local affairs.  Two high profile delegations to Malaysia in 1968 and 1969 were both 
largely ignored, for instance, after it emerged that the Vietnamese visitors barely spoke 
English.41  Likewise, a lengthy and expensive 1967 Latin American tour by former Ambassador 
to Washington 9Ǌ9ăQ7KiLVDZhis team arrive in Rio de Janeiro speaking neither Spanish nor 
Portuguese, only to discover that the government had shut down for the duration of his stay to 
celebrate Carnival.42  Six years later, the Brazil mission was singled out by Budget and Finance 
Committee Chair Hӗ 9ăQ;XkQwho demanded the Foreign Ministry cut costs by recalling 
unqualified staff, alleging that the Rio consulate was conversant exclusively in Vietnamese.43  
Even the capable Washington Embassy was stretched to its limits managing a procession of 
National Assembly tours to far-flung destinations like Salem, Oregon or Fairbanks, Alaska, 
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featuring representatives who, as usual, struggled to communicate in English.44  Designed to 
raise awareness of SDLJRQ¶Vpurported democratic reforms, these parliamentary delegations 
proved a particular burden for the foreign service.  By 1970, diplomats were demanding that 
Prime Minister Trҫn ThiӋn Khiêm curtail the practice, arguing that the tours drained Foreign 
Ministry coffers, sparked PHGLDDFFXVDWLRQVRI³MXQNHWHHULQJ´and impeded Assembly 
proceedings by leaving insufficient legislators on hand to approve new bills.  One assemblyman, 
a Ministry memo noted, had made six one-month international trips in the past year alone.45  
Closer to home, the Foreign Ministry found it difficult to coordinate with the departments 
tasked with economic development, prompting an exasperated President ThiӋu to complain to his 
cabinet WKDW³WKLVcreates a difficult situation to watch: on the one hand, the government and the 
people of Vietnam demand international funds, and on the other, the delegates who call 
themselves representatives of the people do not have a single project or program to vie for the 
ZRUOG¶VDVVLVWDQFH´46  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the Foreign Ministry¶V reputation was less 
than prestigious, as a 1970 report on department performance suggests³:HQHHGDV\VWHP«
which avoids the situation of having employees who work temporarily and perfunctorily in 
Vietnam, and who only look to find ways to leave for foreign countries quickly, so they can 
FRQWULEXWHOLWWOHWRWKHQDWLRQDOFDXVHDQGMXVWHQMR\WKHPVHOYHV´47  
Inexperience coupled with 6DLJRQ¶Vcontroversial reputation saw a tendency towards 
association with already-sympathetic and often questionable right-wing organizations.  In 
Washington, veteran Ambassador Bùi DiӉm took the lead, partnering with Young Americans for 
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Freedom to curate member tours of South Vietnam, and making plans to deploy pro-war 
Vietnamese students and veterans to the United States to shout down American protestors.48  
Asserting WKDW³WKHZDUWRGHWHUPLQHWKHVXUYLYDORIRXUSHRSOHLVLQ$PHULFD´the Defense 
0LQLVWU\¶V3V\FKRORJLFDODQG3ROLWLFDOWarfare Bureau also sprang into action, proposing a new 
VSHDNHUV¶VHULHVWKH9LHWQDPHVH$PHULFDQ&RXQFLO.  The selection of familiar partisans like 
Wesley Fishel and WKH)UHH3DFLILF$VVRFLDWLRQ¶s Raymond de Jaegher as headliners, however, 
was neither novel nor especially inspired.49   
$VZRUGRI6DLJRQ¶VLQLWLDWLYHVSUHDGWKH0LQLVWU\was repeatedly solicited by a 
procession of conservative fringe groups.  Right-wing talk-show Twin Circle Headline 
approached NguyӉQ3K~Ĉӭc in 1970, noting that ³DERXWRI>RXU@SURJUDPVDUHLQGHIHQVH
RI\RXUJRYHUQPHQWDQGDIUHH6RXWK9LHWQDP´LQFOXGLQJ³DIRUPDOGHEDWHZLWK3URI-RQDWKDQ
0LUVN\«>ZKR@LVQRIULHQGRIIUHHGRP´  ³UQOHVVKHOSLVIRUWKFRPLQJ´KRVW'DQLHO/\RQV 
pleadHG³ZHDUHJRLQJWRdrop the pURJUDPLQFLWLHVQH[WPRQWK«If something around 
$10,000 could be promised «ZHFRXOGVXUYLYHWKURXJKWKHZLQWHU´50  The World Anti-
Communist League sought $2 million for ³9LHWQDP5HSRUW´DPRQWKO\(QJOLVK-language 
bulletin to ³SRSXODUL]H 9LHWQDPHVHSROLWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHVRQWKHZRUOGVWDJH´Arguing that 
South Vietnam should instead target ³WKHEORFstanding LQWKHPLGGOH´1JX\ӉQ3K~Ĉӭc 
dismissed WKH/HDJXHDV³DIDU-ULJKWRUJDQL]DWLRQZLWKYHU\OLPLWHGUDQJH´RYHUUXOing Prime 
Minister Trҫn ThiӋn Khiêm.51  Elsewhere, more noble-minded but naïve benefactors drained 
Ministry time and resources, perhaps none more than Freedoms Foundation President Dr. 
Kenneth Wells.  7KHIRXQGHURI³/R\DOW\&LW\´DQG³*DGVGHQ´PRGHO9LHWQDPHVH³)UHHGRP
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9LOODJHV´ for internally-displaced refugees, Wells exasperated Washington Embassy staff by 
promising dozens of charities that Saigon would finance an upcoming Vietnam tour ± without 
first seeking Ministry confirmation.52  Conceding that it might EH³EDGSROLWLFVWRGLVFRXUDJHD
IULHQG´%L'LӋm nonetheless advised that :HOOV³ZDVDELWWRRFRQFHUQHGZLWKseeking 
SXEOLFLW\«>while@KLVSURMHFWZDVWRRH[SHQVLYHDQGUHTXLUHGWRRPXFKSUHSDUDWLRQ´53  Months 
later, the Embassy received a frantic telegram after Saigon was belatedly informed of :HOOV¶
SODQWR³VHQGWZHQW\-four million repeat twenty-IRXUPLOOLRQµFRIIHHFDQV¶´WR9LHWQDP³7KH
FRIIHHFDQV´3ULYDWH6HFUHWDU\+RjQJĈӭF1KmH[SODLQHG³DUHHPSW\FDQVLQZKLFK:HOOHV>VLF@
intends to stufIZLWKKRPHHYHU\GD\XWHQVLOVOLNHKDPPHUQDLOVVFUHZGULYHUVHWF´³3UHVL5HS
[NguyӉQ9ăQ7KLӋX@DVNV\RXWRLPPHGLDWHO\WHOO'U:HOOHV>VLF@WRGURSKLVSODQ´ the cable 
continued.  ³3UHVL5HSKDVQHYHUDVNHGKLPQRUGLG3UHVL5HSFRQVHQWWRWKHZKROHSOan of 
VHQGLQJFRIIHHFDQV«WKHDLUOLIWRUVKLSSLQJRIWKHVHFDQVWR9LHWQDPZLOOH[FHHGWKHFDSDFLW\RI
US [United States] and would not be ver\SURSHU´54 
Further afield, South Vietnam was similarly beguiled by right-wing fringe groups with 
limited broader appeal.  1RWLQJ³GUDPDWLFFLUFXPVWDQFHV´resulting in a spate of anti-leftist 
juntas, a firm representing South American military dictatorships suggested that ³WKHPRPHQWIRU
DWULSWR/DWLQ$PHULFDIRUEHWWHUGLSORPDWLFFRQWDFWVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI\RXUFRXQWU\¶V
SUREOHPVLVIDYRUDEOH´³,KDYHPRVWO\IULHQGVLQWKHQHZVSDSHUILHOG´the invitation continued, 
³>DQG@,DPVXUHWKH\FDQEHYHU\KHOSIXOHYHQRQWKHORFDOSROLWLFDOILHOG´55  South Vietnam also 
featured prominently in Rhodesian propaganda warning WKDW³communist designs in Vietnam are 
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no different from their designs in Southern Africa´56  Some ill-chosen affiliations risked making 
things considerably worse.  In 1970, desperate to boost his domestic stature through the 
impression of American grassroots support, NguyӉn Cao KǤ agreed to speak at a rally for Carl 
McIntire, a Christian-fundameQWDOLVWEURDGFDVWHUGHVFULEHGE\GHWUDFWRUVDV³YLFLRXVO\DQWL-
Catholic and anti-6HPLWLF«DQGVXSSRUW>HG@E\)DVFLVWIULQJHJURXSV´³,VKRXOGOLNHWRXUJH
you as strongly as I know how´LPSORUHGa distressed :HVOH\)LVKHO³to cancel this ill-destined 
trip to the United States.´57  Under intense Ministry pressure, KǤ reluctantly relented, only to 
horrify a ³WRWDOO\GRZQFDVW´%L'LӉm days later by dispatching his wife instead.  When 
mysterious last-minute engine troubles grounded her flight, State Department officials could 
scarcely contain their delight: ³0F,QWLre had already gleefully announced the lady's imminent 
arrival,´ one cable gloated; ³The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away´58  And in Denmark, the 
appointment of 9}ĈuQK.KRiLDV Ambassador backfired after Khoái appointed the editor of 
Reflex, a bankrupt far-ULJKWPDJD]LQHWRUXQ6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VLQIRUPDWLRQRIILFHAn ad 
recruiting mercenaries to fight RQ6DLJRQ¶VEHKDOIUHVXOWHGLQDIORRGRIDQJU\newspaper 
responses, prompting a government statement reiterating that the scheme was prohibited by 
Danish law.59 
Beyond administrative limitations and scant awareness of overseas sensitivities, the 
Foreign Ministry also struggled to adapt to a changing regional strategic environment thrown 
into chaos by the onset of Sino-American rapprochement.  $VQHZVRI+HQU\.LVVLQJHU¶V
landmark 1971 trip to China reached the capitals of Southeast Asia, it created what the National 
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6HFXULW\$GYLVRUGHVFULEHGDVD³VKRFNZDYH´60  Already attentive to the so-called Nixon 
'RFWULQH$PHULFD¶Vregional allies scrambled to reassess their relationships with Washington, 
and above all, with Beijing.  In Malaysia, reactions were relatively calm given that Kuala 
Lumpur had positioned LWVHOIDV³QRQ-DOLJQHG´VLQFH%HLMLQJ¶VSOHGJHWRFXUWDLO
support for the Malaysian communist movement paved the way for rapid normalized relations by 
1974.61  6LQJDSRUH¶V/HH.ZDQ<HZDOVRUHDFWHGSRVLWLYHO\WRWKHQHZVWKRXJKKHcomplained 
about ³WKHVXUSULVHHOHPHQW´Although fears of PRC influence within 6LQJDSRUH¶VChinese 
population delayed recognition until 1990, the Singaporean Prime Minister acknowledged the 
ZLVGRPRI1L[RQ¶VGHFLVLRQ³WKHVLWXDWLRQKDGWREHIDFHG´KHZURWH ³and WKLVLVWKHWLPH´62  
And in Indonesia, which Nixon described DV³WKHELJSUL]H´RI6RXWKHDVW$VLDQHZVRI6LQR-
American rapprochement was also unexpectedly measured.  President Suharto surprised U.S. 
Secretary of State William Rogers during a 1969 visit by informing KLPWKDWJLYHQ,QGRQHVLD¶V
geography, he did not regard China as a major threat to its security.63  Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik meanwhile affirmed that Jakarta recognized the necessity of U.S. troop withdrawals from 
the region, though he cautioned against proceeding too quickly and called for increased 
American aid to make up the slack.64   
With the strategic logic that had prompted it suddenly undercut by revived Sino-
American relations, the Vietnam War now seemed considerably less important to South 
9LHWQDP¶VSXWDWLYHUHJLRQDOSDUWQHUVassuming the United States continued to provide political 
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support and largesse.  Only in Thailand, where economic growth was most contingent on the 
U.S. military and fears of Chinese subversion were ripe, were Vietnamization and 
rapprochement with Beijing seen as cause for alarm.65  And as Henry Kissinger pithily 
suggested, in a remark that would have shocked the previous generation of Cold War strategists, 
³if we withdraw from Thailand, the Thai ZRQ¶WILJKW>&KLQD@«PD\EHZHVKRXOGQ¶WZDQWWKH
Thai to fight.  HLVWRU\ZLOOQRWVWRSLI7KDLODQGJRHVEDFNWREHLQJDQHXWUDOLVWFRXQWU\´66   
As Saigon reached out to its neighbors then, it confronted a region in transition whose 
core strategic assumptions were increasingly questioned.  Reporting from the latest Asia and 
Pacific Council (ASPAC) summit in 1972, 6DLJRQ¶V Ambassador to Seoul ZDUQHGWKDW³Whe 
FRQIHUHQFH«FRXOGPDUNDGHFLVLYHWXUQLQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ$63$&FRXOG
emerge changed not only in its goals and objectives but in its very nature.  An ASPAC 
acceptable to Red China and also communist countries and so-callHGµQHXWUDOV¶ FRXOGDIILOLDWH´
³8nlike the last reunion´KHcontinued³Korean and Japanese representatives abstained from 
PHQWLRQLQJ>FRPPXQLVW@DJJUHVVLRQ´67  Against the backdrop of an expansive communist 
offensive against South Vietnam, the ASPAC proceedings reveal once-likeminded if aloof 
regional powers now prioritizing restored relations with China, an objective which overt 
association with South Vietnam threatened to disrupt.   
The newly-established $VVRFLDWLRQRI6RXWKHDVW$VLDQ1DWLRQV¶$6($1 position on 
Vietnam is also particularly instructive.  An anti-communist alliance whose membership loosely 
overlapped with more security-oriented Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ASEAN 
in theory represented an excellent opportunity for the equally vehement anti-communist Saigon 
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regime to find common cause with its neighbors.  Accordingly, after taking office in 1969, 
Foreign Minister TrҫQ9ăQ/ҳm identified the ASEAN region as a priority for his department: 
³:HFDQQRWVWDQGDOOE\RXUVHOYHVDORQH«ZHDOVRFDQQRWUHO\IRUHYHURQWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIDIDU-
away friend like America, whose sociDOVWUXFWXUHVHFRQRP\DQGSHRSOH¶VOLIHVW\OHVDUH
completely different than ours.  Therefore we need to find friends next to us immediately.  We 
need to connect with the countries which are also in challenging situations like us to create a 
VWURQJEORF´68  But despite WKH0LQLVWU\¶Veagerness to partner in pursuit of ostensibly shared 
LQWHUHVWV$6($1PHPEHUVSURYHGVXUSULVLQJO\FRROWR6DLJRQ¶VPHPEHUVKLSappeals.  
Singapore Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam was found ³ODFNLQJLQV\PSDWK\´ by a 
jilted South Vietnamese delegation after he warned during a 1969 ASEAN conference that 
expanding too quickly to include South Vietnam ZRXOGVHHWKHDVVRFLDWLRQ¶V³SRWHQWLDOLW\´
H[FHHGLWV³FDSDFLW\´69  In response, irritated Presidential Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs 
NguyӉQ3K~Ĉӭc spurned a 1971 Singaporean proposal to open a South Vietnamese trade office, 
GLVPLVVLQJ6LQJDSRUHDV³MXVWDtiny country with a sPDOOHUSRSXODWLRQWKDQ6DLJRQ´  Proceeding 
to list a litany of grievances, Ĉӭc recalled that in addition to rejecting South Vietnam¶V ASEAN 
membership, Singapore opposed U.S. intervention in Laos and Cambodia, and refused to open 
an Embassy despite South Vietnamese representation in Singapore since 1954.70   
Indonesia, on the other hand, sought to boost its regional prestige by issuing proactive if 
vague public appeals for peace in Vietnam.71  As such, Jakarta was happy to consider accepting 
South Vietnam into ASEAN ± provided not only North Vietnam but also the Provisional 
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Revolutionary Government be admitted too. 72  This proposal was anathema to the very premise 
of 6DLJRQ¶V diplomacy, which rejected out of hand communist claims that the P.R.G. represented 
South Vietnam¶VVROHOHJLWLPDWHJRYHUQPHQWAnd unlike Singapore, Indonesia could hardly be 
disregarded DV³MXVWDtiny FRXQWU\´)RUWXQDWHO\ for Saigon, TrҫQ9ăQ/ҳm reported, Indonesia 
had ³WXUQHGWRZDUGVWKHIUHHZRUOG´ZLWKWKHH[WHUPLQDWLRQRIDWOHDVWhalf a million 
suspected Communist Party sympathizers, and was now privately sympathetic to South 
Vietnamese concerns.  Still, Lҳm cautioned, because ³>,QGRQHVLDQ@SXEOLFRSLQLRQZDVVWLOO
SRLVRQHGE\FRPPXQLVWSURSDJDQGD´restoring relations with Jakarta required careful 
clandestine diplomacy.73  This delicate understanding was jeopardized when LҳP¶VSUHGHFHVVRU
TrҫQ9ăQĈӛ accidently disclosed the ongoing secret talks with Suharto, dooming parallel 
American efforts to enlist WKH*HQHUDO¶V KHOSLQPRGHUDWLQJ+DQRL¶VSRVLWLRQ74  Relations with 
Jakarta gradually recovered, though there was little South Vietnam could do to maneuver 
Singapore RU,QGRQHVLD¶VVWULFWSXEOLFVWDQFHVRQ$6($1PHPEHUVKLS 
 Perhaps unexpectedly for an association of anti-communist recipients of ample American 
military aid, ASEAN also took initiative, suggesting the warring Vietnamese parties resolve their 
differences peacefully through the vaguely-specified ³QHXWUDOL]DWLRQ´RIWKHregion.75  To that 
end, sounding rather similar to Charles de Gaulle, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman 
proclaimed Southeast Asia ³a region of peace´ LQDDGGUHVVUHTXHVWLQJWKDW³IRUHLJQ
powers VWRSLQWHUYHQLQJLQWKHUHJLRQDQGUHVSHFWLWVQHXWUDOLW\´76  Initiated largely at Malaysian 
and Indonesian behest and with the enthusiastic support of the Philippines, the peace plan was 
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thin on details and never likely to win favor in Hanoi, led alone Saigon.  Nonetheless, $6($1¶V
progressive public stance elucidated both the shifting strategic priorities prompted by thawing 
U.S.-China relations, and the growing diplomatic and domestic dividends of association with the 
pursuit of peace.   
Privately dismissive of $6($1¶VVSHFXODWLYHVROXWLRQon the not unreasonable 
assumption that Hanoi would never cede footholds LQ6RXWK9LHWQDP6DLJRQ¶Vforeign policy 
corps still acknowledged the wisdom of paying lip-service to such proposals in keeping with its 
campaign to project a constructive image.77  But the President and his Council of Advisors, 
motivated in part, as we shall see, by domestic political calculations, instead overruled the 
diplomatic consensus, countering with assertive foreign policy principles of their own.  Dubbed 
the ³IRXUQRHV´a phrase that could scarcely have run more counter to the premise of positive 
diplomacy, ThiӋX¶VSledge to forbid territorial concessions, negotiations, coalition government, 
and communist or ³QHXWUDOLVW´DFWLYLW\ precluded even the appearance of considering ASEAN 
DQGRWKHUV¶ peace plans.  Though his gesture may have reassured an anxious domestic base, it 
only reinforFHG6RXWK9LHWQDP¶V perceived recalcitrance, prompting colleagues like Lower 
House Defense Committee Chair TrҫQ9ăQĈ{QWRLQVLVWWKDWWKHIRXUQRHV³EHUHFDVWLQDPRUH
SRVLWLYHFRQWH[WWRDSSHDOWRLQWHUQDWLRQDORSLQLRQ´78   
%XWZKLOH6DLJRQ¶Vapparent obstreperousness was out of touch with the new regional 
zeitgeist, the failure to inspire neighborly solidarity owed more to an incongruous strategic 
transition.  Its symbolic value eroding as the Domino Theory¶Vcurrency waned, South Vietnam 
offered little to an area recalibrating geopolitical assumptions LQDQWLFLSDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VUHstored 
standing.  Likewise, though 6DLJRQ¶VUHSUHVVHGRSSRVLWLRQVKDUHG$6($1¶V]HDOIRU negotiations 
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with the North, the notion of a settlement based on regional neutrality held little appeal for the 
hardline supporters of a President grasping for military and political survival.79  With shifting 
regional calculations elevating both the international rewards and domestic costs of appearing to 
embrace peace, the Foreign Ministry struggled to balance these competing imperatives, its efforts 
undercut at home while forsaken abroad. 
DOMESTIC PARADOXES  
In the spring of 1966, the VHFRQG%XGGKLVWXSULVLQJLQWKUHH\HDUVVDZWKHFLWLHVRIĈj
Nҹng and HuӃ effectively lost to central government control after anti-military protests by 
PRQNVVWXGHQWVWHDFKHUVFLYLOVHUYDQWVDQGHYHQWKH0D\RURIĈj1ҹng.  Order was restored 
only by force following weeks of intense street-to-street fighting.  Dangling a carrot after 
brandishing the stick, Prime Minister NguyӉn Cao KǤ sought to placate a skeptical public by 
promising elections and a new constitution.  His pledges were also intended to reassure voters in 
the United States, where doubts about the war were fuelled by the revived Buddhist-led 
insurgency.  During a 1966 encounter in Honolulu, President Johnson was explicit that continued 
support for South Vietnam hinged on the appearance of domestic reform.80  Well aware of a 
growing global audience, liberal politicians like Lý Quí Chung leveraged American scrutiny into 
military concessions on the constitution, calculating that pressure to present Johnson with a 
finished draft at the upcoming Guam Conference would force KǤ¶VKDQG81 
 To be sure, the elections scheduled for September 1967 were a considerable gamble for 
the United States and the South Vietnamese military, risking the possibility that political 
competition could spiral out of control, in turn provoking another counterproductive military 
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coup:H³RXJKWWRWDNHRXWFRXSLQVXUDQFHDJDLQVWWKLVULVN´RQH:KLWH+RXVHmemo 
suggested.82  But given the growing pressure for reform from constituents on both sides of the 
Pacific, Washington and Saigon had few alternatives.  ³7he next two or three years will be 
FUXFLDOIRUWKH9LHWQDPHVHDQG$PHULFDQSHRSOH´observed 3KDQ4XDQJĈiQDrespected 
politician known for his arrest and torture under 1J{ĈuQK'LӋP³7he new government must 
have wide popular support´ĈiQ UHLWHUDWHG³so it can undertake necessary reforms and introduce 
QHZSURJUDPV´83  6WLOOZKLOHWKHHOHFWLRQVZHUHDQDFNQRZOHGJPHQWWKDW6DLJRQ¶VFUHGLELOLW\
abroad was contingent on popular support at home, they were intended strictly to legitimize 
rather than replace the incumbent authority.  As Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge argued³WKH
PLOLWDU\LVWKHRQO\JURXSZKLFKKDVH[SHULHQFHRUFRPSHWHQFHLQPDQDJLQJWKHFRXQWU\«>WKH\@
will need to run the country for some time, and if we give any real power to civilians, the 
PLOLWDU\ZLOORYHUWKURZWKHJRYHUQPHQW´84   
Given these conservative objectives, it was perhaps unsurprising how quickly the public 
relations component of the September contests was tarnished.  Reports from the provinces of 
threats, harassment, and the transfer or demotion of civilian candidate supporters soon reached 
the capital, prompting appeals for American intervention to guarantee a fair result.85  Press 
censorship, meanwhile, proceeded without interruption despite having been proscribed since 
April by the new constitution.  The repression of their peers drew the predictable ire of American 
correspondents, with the Washington Evening Star, for instance, UHSRUWLQJWKDW³erratic, illogical 
DQGDUELWUDU\´ military censorship was imposed even on the remarks of both the Foreign Minister 
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and Prime Minister KǤ himself.86  Unable to air grievances at KRPH6DLJRQ¶VLQFUHDVLQJO\VDYY\
opposition turned instead to American outlets, with candidates like ÆX7Uѭӡng Thanh providing 
copy for anti-war ads in the New York Times³,VWKLVZKDW$PHULFDQVKDYHGLHGIRU´"
inquired one example complete with reproductions of censored Saigon Post columns.87  And 
when the Embassy finally prevailed upon the generals to relax press censorship in June, an 
outpouring of anti-military articles immediately followed.88  Before it had even formally begun 
then, the election had already been discredited by the very audience whose loyalty it was staged 
to recover.  As Lower House candidate Lý Quí Chung recalled³Qobody believed the election 
would be carried out honestly.´89   
Sure enough, amid reports of rampant electoral fraud, the military capitalized on its vast 
financial and organizational advantages, administering victory against a divided civilian field, 
albeit with just 34% of the vote.  The big surprise was a second place showing for lawyer 7UѭѫQJ
ĈuQK']XZKRcleverly campaigned for peace negotiations only after his candidacy was 
approved.  Days later, he was detained on ³SROLWLFDOO\-PRWLYDWHG´ILYH-year-old currency trading 
charges, according to the Embassy, and then placed under iQGHILQLWH³SURWHFWLYHFXVWRG\´
following the 1968 Tet Offensive.  By now a well-NQRZQV\PEROLFILJXUH']X¶VTXHVWLRQDEOH
arrest furWKHUXQGHUPLQHGWKHFRPSURPLVHGUHKDELOLWDWLRQRI6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VGLVPDO
international image.90   
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Promoted as ex post facto validation of the war, the elections instead served only to 
FRPSOLFDWH6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VUHEUDQGLQJFDPSDLJQconfirming rather than debunking unflattering 
global perceptions.  The New York Times dismissed the proceedings DVD³IDUFH´ZKLOHWKH
Baltimore Sun ODEHOOHGWKHP³DJULPFRPHG\´7KH%ULWLVKGuardian offered a slightly more 
charitable interpretation, describing WKHFRQWHVWDV³OHVVRIDFKDUDGHWKDQH[SHFWHG´91  
International election monitors came away equally unimpressed.  Sa Kwang Uk, a judge chairing 
the South Korean Central Election Management Committee tasked with overseeing the 
Assembly vote, shared his observations in Chosun Ilbo newspaper:  ³7KHUHZHUHQHLWKHU
watchers, QRUYRWHUV¶VOLSV$Q\RQHSURGXFLQJDFLWL]HQVKLSFDUGZDVLVVXHGEDOORWSDSHUV
representing candidates.  Each voter chose seven and deposited them in ballot boxes.  The 
remaining 52 he threw away. The remaining ballot papers, if just put into the boxes, could have 
EHHQFRXQWHGDVYDOLG«WKHWDOOLHVUHVXOWVZHUHVLPSO\UDGLRHGRUWHOHSKRQHGIURPFRXQWLHVWR
provincial seats, DQGRQWR6DLJRQIRUILQDOVXPPLQJXS«LIDQHOHFWLRQZHUHKHOGLQ.RUHDWKDW
ZD\SRSXODUSURWHVWVZRXOGURFNWKHZKROHQDWLRQ´92  Australian External Affairs Minister Paul 
Hasluck, meanwhile, regretted WKDW6RXWK9LHWQDPKDG³VRTXLFNO\XQGHUPLQHGWKHSRsitive 
LPDJHWKDWFDPHDVDUHVXOWRIDQQRXQFLQJWKHHOHFWLRQ´93  Within South Vietnam, however, 
expectations had always been tempered.  TrҫQ9ăQ7X\Ӄn, a prominent lawyer associated with 
the Vietnamese Nationalist Party perhaps best captured the prevailinJPRRG³,DPDQ[LRXVWR
note that the Second Republic is deficient at its very beginning and that its existence is seriously 
WKUHDWHQHGDWLWVYHU\ELUWK«but in the midst of the current political chaos, having something in 
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hand is better than void and nothingness´94  And indeed, despite blatant military interference, 
the elections nonetheless brought an end to the tumult subsuming South Vietnamese politics after 
DiӋP¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQUHVWRULQJDOHJDOEDVLVKRZHYHUKDOWLQJO\REVHUYHGIRUPLOLWDU\UXOH Still, 
as a platform for public promotion and for distancing South Vietnam from its communist 
competitors, the exercise was a substantial disappointment. 
Having surprised observers by supplanting rival NguyӉn Cao KǤ, NguyӉQ9ăQ7KLӋX¶V 
position was still by no means secure even as he assumed the Presidency.  Aloof, uncharismatic, 
and with no regional or religious base, he enjoyed less military support than the gregarious KǤ.  
Instead, presenting himself as a sober and responsible statesman, ThiӋu calculated that by 
professing to uphold the constitution, he could neutralize KǤ¶Vesteem in the armed forces by 
securing American backing, at a time when the United States sought above all to forestall further 
coups.  Meanwhile, partly to undermine NguyӉQ9ăQ/ӝc, KǤ¶VFRQVRODWLRQFKRLFHIRU3ULPH
Minster, ThiӋu fostered ties ZLWKWKH$VVHPEO\¶V northern Catholic refugee bloc, which resented 
the appointment of a southern P.M.  Helmed by the Greater Solidarity Force and the Nhân Xã 
Party, the northern Catholic deputies boasted a potent regional identity, zealous anti-
communism, and a disciplined village-level network enabling their sweep to legislative power 
despite being outnumbered.  Their intensive lobbying forced NguyӉQ9ăQ/ӝF¶VUHVLJQDWLRQ 
during the chaos of the Tet Offensive, which ThiӋu likewise exploited to replace KǤ¶VPLOLWDU\ 
partisans with loyalists of his own.95  By the end of 1968, the President enjoyed substantial 
authority over the armed forces. 
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 But the National Assembly was an altogether different matter.  Emboldened by NguyӉn 
9ăQ Lӝc¶VGHPLVH, northern Catholic legislators were disgruntled when successor TrҫQ9ăQ
+ѭѫQJ, another more-eminent southerner, was selected to counterEDODQFH7KLrX¶Vreliance on 
Assembly northerners.96  Foreign Minister Trҫn Chánh Thành also found himself under 
mounting parliamentary pressure despite impeccable anti-communist credentials as architect of 
1J{ĈuQK'LӋP¶VQRWRULRXVO\H[FHVVLYH³'HQRXQFHWKH&RPPXQLVWV´campaign.97  At a time of 
heightened alarm over impending U.S.-1RUWK9LHWQDPHVHQHJRWLDWLRQV7KjQK¶VFDOOIRU6RXWK
Vietnam to assume a constructive peace stance rather than cede proceedings to third parties set 
off alarm bells among Assembly hardliners.  After a series of heated Senate interpolation 
sessions, Thiêu relented in August 1969UHSODFLQJ+ѭѫQJDQG7KjQKZLWKretired general Trҫn 
ThiӋn Khiêm and former DiӋm partisan TrҫQ9ăQ/ҳm respectively.98  Trҫn Chánh 7KjQK¶VIDWH
provides an instructive example of the Second Republic¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\FRQWUDGLFWLRQV.  As we 
have seen, Thành and KLVFROOHDJXHVUHDVRQHGWKDWUHSDLULQJ6DLJRQ¶V public image in response to 
global war-weariness required re-engaging neglected neighbors and conditioning clamors for 
peace to its advantage, citing events like the Tet Offensive to cast the communists as inveterate 
belligerents.  But though their approach paid modest dividends abroad, it was intolerable to the 
$VVHPEO\¶VLQIOXHQWLDOKDZNV.99  Caught between constituents at home and abroad with 
dramatically divergent expectations, ThiӋu struggled to satisfy both parties, his rhetoric 
oscillating from moderate or militant according to its audience. 
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Irritated by Assembly interference with his political agenda, ThiӋu lashed out against 
liberal parliamentarians, in part to signal straying supporters without targeting them directly.  
Instead, the trumped-up arrests of prominent figures OLNH7UѭѫQJĈӏQK']X1J{&{QJĈӭc and 
Trҫn Ngӑc Châu achieved an unlikely consensus against the abuse of executive power.  
Capitalizing on disproportionate overseas influence over Vietnamese domestic affairs, once-
irreconcilable deputies reached out abroad, tapping global networks established during 
worldwide Assembly promotional tours to publicize the plight of their imprisoned colleagues.100  
Once the avatars of the state¶V public relations, 6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VHOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVnow 
challenged the basis of the very campaign they had been dispatched to endorse.  By late 1969, 
the clash between legislature and executive ZDVFDXVLQJVHULRXVKDUPWRWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VGRPHVWLF
agenda, with Austerity Tax and Land Reform bills ± both seen in Washington as tests of ThiӋX¶V
ability to rule ± delayed for months by Assembly grandstanding over political prisoners.101  
Ascendant over the military but exasperated by insubordinate opposition, ThiӋu seized upon the 
1971 Presidential Election to ³VPDVKWKHWUHDVRQRXVGHPDJRJLFUKHWRULFRIDPLQRULW\RI
GHIHDWLVWV´DVDQLQWHUQDOSODQQLQJGRFXPHQWSXWLWFRQVSLULQJWRSUHFOXGH1JX\Ӊn Cao KǤ from 
contending and ordering the military bureaucracy to implement a victory in the provinces.102  
The scheme backfired when challengers KǤ DQG'ѭѫQJ9ăQ0LQK obtained ThiӋX¶Vwritten vote-
rigging instructions and withdrew their candidacies in protest.103  Ignoring a horrified White 
House, ThiӋu proceeded apace, reframing the now-uncontested election as a referendum on his 
rule.  Months later, using the pretext of Emergency Powers legislation after the communist 
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Easter Offensive, he imposed severe restrictions on political parties and the press, effectively 
ending South VietnaP¶VEULHIH[SHULPHQWZLWK limited democracy.104 
2SSRVLWLRQSDUWLHVZHUHSUHGLFWDEO\RXWUDJHGZLWK9Ǌ9ăQ0үX¶V%XGGKLVWVODWHWHDPLQJ
with Senate Chairman NguyӉQ9ăQ+X\ӅQ¶VPRVWO\-Catholic Lily group to condemn the 
proceedings. 105  And even once-stalwart loyalists saw the election as a point of no return.  
Ambassador-to-Washington Bùi DiӉmSHUKDSV6DLJRQ¶V most well-connected and effective 
representative, recalled the debacle as the PRPHQWZKHQ³WKHVHDUFKIRUDYLYLI\LQJQDWLRQDO
SXUSRVHZDVILQDOO\GLVFDUGHGLQIDYRURIWKHFKLPHULFDOVWUHQJWKRIDQDXWRFUDW´  Confiding in 
Secretary of State William Rogers that he was ³YHU\PXFKDWORRVHHQGV«RYHUKLVLQDELOLW\WR
gain sympathetic support from traditional friends of Vietnam in the U.S.,´WKHGHVSRQGHQW
diplomat considered requesting a transfer to Tokyo.106  
The President could also hardly claim ignorance of the diplomatic fallout from arrogating 
power.  For some time, confidants OLNHKLVFRXVLQ3ULYDWH6HFUHWDU\+RjQJĈӭc Nhã, had 
stressed WKDWDFWLRQDJDLQVW³FRUUXSWLRQDQGVRFLDOMXVWLFH´ZDVSDUDPRXQWLQ³LPSURYLQJWKH
DWWLWXGHVRIWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOHWRZDUGV9LHWQDP´107  By mid-1971, citing public disgust with 
both the elections and official complicity in drug trafficking, South Vietnamese intelligence 
reported WKDW³$PHULFDLVQRORQJHUFRQFHUQHGZLWK6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VVXUYLYDO´108  Likewise, 
Senators Mike Mansfield and George Aiken alerted TrҫQ9ăQĈӛ that Saigon should anticipate 
³GLIILFXOWLHVLQPDLQWDLQLQJIXQGLQJOHYHOV´insisting WKDW³6RXWK9LHWQDPQHHGVWRSURYHWRWKH
                                                          
104
 Airgram A-³7H[WRI1HZ'HFUHH-/DZRQWKH3UHVV´Saigon to State Department, August 14, 1972, POL 5 
Viet-S, 1970-1973, CFPF, box 2808, RG59, NARA; Telegram 13675 Saigon to State Department, September 18, 
1972, POL 12-5 Viet-S, 1970-1973, CFPF, box 2810, RG59, NARA. 
105
 ³7KX\Ӄt trình cӫa Nghӏ Vƭ9Ǌ9ăQ0үu tҥL7Kѭӧng Nghӏ viӋQ´ September 22, 1971, HS5686, 
PTTDIICH/VNAC2. 
106
 Bui Diem, In the Jaws of History, (Boston, 1987): 293; Telegram 178333 State Department to Saigon, September 
28, 1971. VCF, box 157, folder 3, NSF, RNL. 
107
 +RjQJĈӭF1Km³1Kұn xӃt vӅ GѭOXұn dân Mӻ´-XQHHS1581, PTTDIICH/VNAC2. 
108
 ³7uQKKuQK+RD.Ǥ - %iRFiRWKiQJ´XQGDWHGHS1830, PTTDIICH/VNAC2. 
$PHULFDQSXEOLFWKDWLWKDVDµYLDEOHIXWXUH¶´109 Senator Henry Jackson, once described by 
(OOVZRUWK%XQNHUDV³RQHRIWKHVWURQJHVWDQGPRVWVWDOZDUWVXSSRUWHUVRI>1L[RQ¶V@9LHWQDP
SROLF\´ went furtherGHFODULQJKHZRXOG³UHVHUYHP\SRVLWLRQUHJDUGLQJIXWXUH86PLOLWDU\DQG
HFRQRPLFDLG´VKRXOGWKHuncontested election SURFHHG´110  And Jackson was just one of many 
Vietnam defectors from both parties who cited conditions in South Vietnam as the basis for their 
withdrawn support.  Days after ThiӋX¶VUH-election, the Senate defeated a proposed $565 million 
aid bill for Saigon, the absence of which, a South Vietnamese spokesman warned, ³ZRXOG
SUREDEO\PHDQDFRPPXQLVWYLFWRU\LQVKRUWRUGHU´³2XUHFRQRP\LVWRWDOO\GHSHQGHQWRQ
$PHULFDQDLG´Dgovernment economist added.111   Even Anna Chennault, broker of ThiӋX¶V 
secret 1968 pledge with Nixon to sabotage any U.S.-North Vietnamese agreement, advised ThiӋu 
³DVDIULHQG´WKDWWKH5HSXEOLFDQ3DUW\ZDV³ORVLQJSDWLHQFH´ZLWKhis ³IDLOXUHWRDFKLHYHWKH
SDUWLFLSDWLRQRUVXSSRUWRIQDWLRQDOLVWHOHPHQWV´³,WKLQNWKH\DUHORRNLQJIRUDQH[FXVHWRJHW
RXW´VKHZDUQHG³DQGWLPHLVUXQQLQJVKRUW´112  With American congressional and public 
support dwindling in no small part due WR6DLJRQ¶VGLVPDOGRPHVWLFSHUIRUPDQFH1L[RQDQG
Kissinger hastened to deliver a settlement in time for the 1972 U.S. Presidential Election, 
complete with the FRQFHVVLRQVWKDWZRXOGMHRSDUGL]H6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VVXUYLYDO    
The election also dealt a blow to what remained of the Many Flags campaign.  In New 
Zealand, one of just two allies covering their own military costs, the unopposed contest imposed 
severe constraints on Wellington¶VDELOLW\Wo sustain its support.  Already facing a domestic 
backlash, Prime Minister Keith Hollyoake informed ThiӋXWKDW³LQGHIHQFHRI1HZ=HDODQG¶V
role in South Vietnam «he [had gone] to some lengths to state [his] confidence in the reality and 
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WKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHHOHFWLRQV´  A one-man ballot would jeopardize his JRYHUQPHQW¶V position, 
Hollyoake implored, ZKLFK³KDGQRWJRQHXQFRQWHVWHG´DQGZRXOG³FUHDWHHPEDUUDVVPHQWDQG
difficulty IRU6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VFORVHVWDOOLHV«EOXU>ULQJ@WKHVKDUSGLIIHUHQFHVRIDSSURDFKDQG
intention which, for New Zealand and other supporters of South Vietnam, have always been 
DSSDUHQWEHWZHHQWKHDXWKRULWLHVLQ6DLJRQDQG+DQRL´113  Though New Zealand¶VWRNen 
presence hardly tipped the military balance, the beleaguered ThiӋu regime could ill-afford to 
VTXDQGHU:HOOLQJWRQ¶V status as one RI6DLJRQ¶VIHZ democratically-elected advocates. 
Although the fateful 1973 settlement with Hanoi enabled a new round of international 
recognition for both North and South Vietnam, the additional diplomatic support did little to 
DGGUHVV6DLJRQ¶s existential fiscal shortfall.  Even WKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\ZDVRUGHUHGWR³VKHG
VNLQ´DV)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV&RPPLWWHHPHPEHU&DR9ăQ7ѭӡng put it, proposing DXVWHULW\¶V
IDPLOLDUUHIUDLQRI³GRLQJPRUHZLWKOHVV´to compensate for dwindling American aid, which 
despite reductions remained substantial at $700 million for fiscal year 1975.114  Desperate to plug 
gaping holes in the budget, South Vietnam scrambled for alternative aid sources, spearheaded by 
a lavish 1973 world tour featuring the President and a ninety-member entourage.  But the 
delegation was spurned at virtually every stop, rendered politically toxic by ThiӋX¶V
disappointing domestic record.  In West Germany, identified with Japan as one of two states with 
the means to offset U.S. cutbacks, government spokesmen sought to appease protestors by 
categorizing ThiӋX¶Varrival as a mere ³JHVWXUHRIFRXUWHV\´LQVLVWLQJhis visit would last no 
more than a few hours.  Unmoved, demonstrators hurled cobblestones at police, wounding 35 
officers and causing extensive property damage.  Behind the scenes, it took considerable 
American Embassy pressure before a reluctant Bonn relentHG³)RUUHDVRQVRIVHFXULW\´ThiӋu 
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was granted a fifty-minute meeting at a secluded military airport, where his hosts explained that 
³ZHQHHG\RXWRKHOSXVKHOS\RX´115   Arriving in Tokyo, the party was likewise informed that 
³ZKLOH-DSDQZDVYHU\FRQFerned with assisting South Vietnam, [ThiӋu] still needed to deal with 
a number of related problems, including left-ZLQJSURWHVWV«DQGDQXPEHURILQWHUQDOGLIILFXOWLHV
caused by the economic situDWLRQ´116   Canberra, a longstanding troop contributor, was even 
more curt, with Prime Minister Lance Barnard refusing to permit entry after declaring that ThiӋu 
ZDV³QRWZHOFRPH DQG>ZRXOG@QRWEHJLYHQDQ\DLG´117   And Mexico, with little at stake, 
allowed a South Vietnamese delegation to study Mexican land reform only after American 
lobbying, and on condition that its presence remain secret.118  So noxious was the ThiӋu regime 
that even oil companies balked at offshore exploration in Vietnam, with a spokesman for 
Standard Oil of New Jersey explaining WKDWKHZDV³PRVWDQ[LRXVWRDYRLGDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFK
RLOFRPSDQ\LQWHUHVWVZHUHDOOHJHGWREHDUHDVRQIRUFRQWLQXHG86LQYROYHPHQWLQ9LHWQDP´119 
Effectively dooming the search for overseas solidarity and alternative partners, the 
unopposed election fiasco exposed the conceptual failings of South Vietnam¶VJOREDORXWUHDFK
campaign.  In courting external assistance and legitimacy to compensate for internal military, 
economic and political shortcomings, the ThiӋu regime essentially confused the causal links 
between its foreign and domestic affairs.  Given its stratospheric aid requirements and dwindling 
strategic value, only unimpeachable local support could attract the staggering foreign 
contributions that Saigon demanded from diplomacy.  Conceived in part to assure patrons for 
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whom promoting democracy was more than mere euphemism for advancing American interests 
abroad, the 1971 election instead confirmed for many that South Vietnam was beyond salvation. 
* * * 
 Despite the imminent withdrawal of the last American troops from Vietnam, Foreign 
Minister TrҫQ9ăQ/ҳm professed an astonishingly optimistic view of 6DLJRQ¶Vposition in 
January 1973.  Looking ahead, LҳPSUHGLFWHGWKDW³WKHSURJUDPRIVietnamization will be 
completed, and we will realize the success of our policies of self-VWUHQJWKHQLQJDQGUHVLOLHQFH´
HHERDVWHGRIKLV0LQLVWU\¶VDFKLHYHPHQWV WKHSUHYLRXV\HDUZKLFKLQFOXGHG³SUHSDULQJZRUOG
RSLQLRQWRVXSSRUWXV«E\GHQRXQFLQJFRPPunist terrorism,´³FRQVROLGDWLQJHIIRUWVWRWLJKWHQ
friendships in Southeast Asia and Africa,´DQG³H[SDQGLQJWKHSUHVHQFHRI6RXWKVietnam 
around the world.´A source of particular pride was the fact that all Southeast Asian states save 
Myanmar had opposed the 35*¶V inclusion at the latest Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers 
Conference, one of 168 international gatherings in 1972 featuring South Vietnamese 
representation.  The Ministry had also organized delegations to Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Liberia and Kenya, and established formal diplomatic relations with Israel, with Venezuela and 
Iran expected to follow suit.  Though the forthcoming settlement with Hanoi posed an existential 
challenge, the Minister promised that his department could sHFXUH³PDVVLYHLnternational aid to 
UHEXLOG6RXWK9LHWQDP«ZKLOHJXDUGLQJDJDLQVWWKUHDWVWRLWVVRYHUHLJQW\´120 
 :LWK6RXWK9LHWQDP¶V0LQLVWULHVLQFUHDVLQJO\supplanted by ThiӋX¶V Council of 
Advisors, LҳP¶VUHport was as much a plea for his department as a dispassionate analysis, 
reflecting the global scale of 6DLJRQ¶VRXWUHDFKalong with vestiges of the high hopes once vested 
in foreign affairs.  Behind closed doors however, the 0LQLVWU\¶Vprognosis was decidedly more 
sober.  Undermined by domestic developments contradicting the basic premise of its diplomacy, 
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6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VTXHVWWRelicit overseas political support produced limited results.  And despite 
prescient efforts to reduce dependence on the United States, the ThiӋu regime remained 
perilously exposed to the whims of American voters.  FRXU\HDUVDIWHU5LFKDUG1L[RQ¶VQDUURZ
1968 victory had DFFHOHUDWHG6DLJRQ¶VZRUOGZLGHSXEOLFUHODWLRQVagenda, ³WKHIXWXUHRI
Vietnam´RQHDQDO\VWZURWH ³still more or less hinges on the result of the November 1972 
election´121  Even foreign policy professionals questioned the benefits that the far-flung 
campaign might bring.  Phan Công Tâm, an intelligence officer who accompanied Martine 
Bokassa to Bangui, recalls ZRQGHULQJ³why my government cared so much for its image in a 
country that had no connection with the defense of South Vietnam DWWKLVFULWLFDOWLPH´122  
Phùng Nhұt Minh, meanwhile, prioritized internal reform above chasing alternative patrons: 
³)rom now on, the task of overseas information should be ranked second.  The first and most 
important task, which demands the most attention, brainpower and expense, has to be activities 
which will strengthen our national forces to satisfy the two requirements of preserving security 
and development´123   
Although the last stages of American involvement in the Vietnam War are often seen as a 
fiscal clash between Congress and the White House, NguyӉQ9ăQThiӋX¶Vauthoritarianism ± 
which compromised the entire stated purpose of the war ± was a critical factor provoking the 
spending cuts that hastened Vietnamization and impelled the 1973 settlement with North 
Vietnam.  Struggling to reconcile the divergent demands of foreign and domestic constituents, 
ThiӋu pursued repressive stability at the expense of a cacophonous constitutional system, 
ultimately damaging his credibility both at home and abroad.  WKHQ6RXWK9LHWQDP¶Vjournalists 
and legislators, the very emblems of WKHVWDWH¶VVHOI-proclaimed redemption, seized the global 
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platform afforded them to instead decry the ³dictatorial, corrupt, rotten policy of NguyӉQ9ăQ
ThiӋu,´ as one opposition bloc put it, the effect was devastating, bringing to mind perhaps the 
adage that ³a great ad campaign only makes DEDGSURGXFWIDLOIDVWHU´124  In alienating domestic 
and therefore international onlookers, Saigon was condemned to continued isolation, vulnerable 
to a unilateral American settlement and left with no realistic diplomatic alternatives.  To be sure, 
an effective foreign policy was just one of many prerequisites for 6RXWK9LHWQDP¶Valways 
unlikely survival, subordinate, as we have seen, to building a broad local support base.  And 
indeed, despite an impeccably cosmopolitan scope, Saigon¶VIDLOHG bid for legitimacy from 
abroad amid spiralling discontent at home suggests that effective diplomacy requires sound 
domestic foundations. 
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